This paper o¤ers a plausible explanation for the close link between oil prices and aggregate macroeconomic performance in the 1970s. Although this link has been well documented in the empirical literature, standard economic models are not able to replicate this link when actual oil prices are used to simulate the models. In particular, standard models cannot explain the depth of the recession in 1974-75 and the strong revival in 1976-78 based on the oil price movements in that period. This paper argues that a missing multiplier-accelerator mechanism from standard models may hold the key.
Introduction
A large body of empirical literature has suggested that oil price shocks have an important e¤ect on economic activity. This literature has convincingly argued that oil prices were both signi…cant determinants of U.S. economic activity and exogenous to it in the post-war period. 1 However, despite 30 years of research since the …rst major post-war oil crisis in 1973-74, how exactly can oil shocks cause a severe economic recession still remains an open question. Imported oil as an input for the entire U.S. economy accounted for roughly one to two percent of the total production cost in the early 1970s. Based on this cost share, and assuming constant returns to scale, even a 100% increase in the price of oil can only translate into an approximately one to two percent decrease in output, notwithstanding the likely counter e¤ects from factor substitutions. Yet the actual decline in output following the 1973 oil crisis, which caused a roughly 80 percent increase in the price of imported oil, was about seven to eight percent from its peak. A strong multiplier is clearly missing in standard models.
Standard economic theory not only substantially under-predicts the contraction of output following the oil shocks in 1973-74, but also fails to explain the revival of the U.S. economy starting in the middle of 1975 despite the continuing rise in the oil price level in that period. Standard theory predicts an immediate, permanent drop in output after a permanent increase in oil prices, while empirical studies show that output undergoes a U-shaped transitional path after a permanent oil shock. 2 For example, real GDP dropped by only 2 percent on impact in 1974, and the contraction continued for nearly 5 more quarters until 1975. Also, despite oil prices remaining high and continuing to rise throughout the late 1970s, the U.S. economy started to recover in the middle of 1975, and by the end of 1977 real GDP was already back to its potential trend level. Such a dramatic recovery after a nearly permanent oil price increase is not predicted by standard general equilibrium models. Figure 1 illustrates these multiplier-accelerator e¤ects after the oil price increases in late 1973.
In the top panel, the solid line represents the log price of imported oil, and the dashed lines represent percentage changes of the oil price. In the middle panel, the solid line represents ‡uctuations in GDP relative to its trend (de…ned by the HP …lter). In the 4th quarter of 1973 and the …rst quarter of 1974, when the oil price increased sharply (nearly doubled), real GDP dropped by only two percent, consistent with the prediction of a standard economic model. However, the contraction 1 This is especially true before the mid-1980s. See, for example, Rasche and Tatom (1981) , Hamilton (1983 Hamilton ( , 1985 Hamilton ( , 1996 Hamilton ( , 2003 , Burbidge and Harrison (1984) , Santini (1985) , Gisser and Goodwin (1986) , Loungani (1986) , Tatom (1988) , Mork (1989) , Hamilton and Herrera (2004) , and many others. Also see the references in Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) . 2 Empirical tests show that post-war oil prices follow a random walk. This is especially true prior to the early 1980s. This suggests that oil price changes are permanent for the period we study.
continued during the entire year of 1974. A trough was not reached until 5 quarters later in early 1975, and by then real GDP had declined more than seven percent from its pre-shock level. Also notice the revival in 1975. Within 3 years, the U.S. economy was almost back to its pre-shock level again by the 4th quarter of 1978, despite oil prices remaining high and continuing to rise throughout that period. Another striking aspect of the 1974-75 recession is that …xed investment su¤ered the severest hit both absolutely and relative to output. Based on HP-…ltered data (the bottom panel in Figure   1 ), the fall in investment during an average recession prior to the 1973 oil shock was about 20% from peak to trough. During 1974-75, however, investment fell by more than 35% from its peak.
Furthermore, the standard deviation of investment was about 4:4 times that of output prior to the 1973 oil shock. This volatility ratio increased to 7:1 during the 1973 oil shock period. In contrast, the ratio of the standard deviation of non-durable goods consumption to GDP was about 0:54 prior to the 1973 oil shock, and became 0:31 during the oil shock period.
Thus, there are several major puzzles associated with the 1975 recession following the oil shock in 1973-74: 1). Why was the recession so deep -much deeper than predicted by standard models?
2). Why was the trough of the recession delayed for 4-6 quarters?
3). Why was there a strong recovery in economic activity in 1976-78 despite oil prices remaining high and continuing to rise during the entire period? 4). Why did investment su¤er the severest hit during that period compared to other components of GDP?
The …rst puzzle has already drawn a substantial amount of attention. But the last three puzzles have rarely been emphasized in the theoretical literature. Hamilton and Herrera (2004) stress that explaining the delay of the e¤ects of oil price shocks is an important challenge for theory: "(...) the greatest e¤ects of an oil shock do not appear until three or four quarters after the shock.
Investigating the cause of this delay would seem to be an important topic for research" (Hamilton To search for the missing multiplier on the real side of the economy, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) argue that monopolistic competition is responsible for amplifying the impact of the oil shock.
Finn (2000), however, disputes this theory by arguing that perfect competition can also account for the depth of the recession if …rms' capacity utilization rate is allowed to vary in response to the oil shock. Neither of these models, however, is able to explain the accelerator e¤ect of the oil shock: the greatest e¤ects of the oil shock do not appear until several quarters after the shock, and a strong recovery is observed within a couple of years despite oil prices remaining high. Figure 1 .
This paper proposes a model to explain the multiplier-accelerator e¤ect of oil shocks on the U.S. economy in the 1970s. Our explanation builds on the insights of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Finn (2000) , and is closely related to the suggestion of Hamilton (1988a Hamilton ( , 1988b Hamilton ( and 2003 our analysis at the period before the mid-80s because our model is not suitable for analyzing the e¤ects of the negative oil shocks after the mid-80s. However, we do extend our analysis to cover the second major oil crisis in 1979-80.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its empirical predictions. Section 3 provides circumstantial empirical evidence to support the predictions of our model. Section 4 extends the analysis to the second oil shock period between 1979 and 1984.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
The model we study is a slightly modi…ed version of the model of Wen (1998) o denotes oil. We assume that oil cannot be domestically produced and the elasticities satisfy fa o ; a k ; a n g 2 [0; 1] and (a k + a n + a o ) 1, indicating possible increasing returns to scale at the …rm level. Assuming that …rms are price takers in the factor markets, the pro…ts of …rm i are then 
is concave as long as (a k + a n + a o ) 1: Pro…t maximization by each intermediate-good-producing …rm leads to the following …rst order conditions:
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have n i = n; k i = k; e i = e; i = ; o i = o; y i = y = Y; i = ; and p i = 1:
A representative consumer in the economy maximizes expected life-time utility,
subject to c t + s t+1 = (1 + r t )s t + w t n t + t ; where s denotes aggregate savings. Since the aggregate factor payment for oil, p o o; goes to foreigners, it is not included in the consumer's income. The …rst order conditions for utility maximization with respect to labor supply and savings are given, respectively, by bn t = 1 ct w t and
: In equilibrium, s t = k t and factor prices equal their marginal products.
By substitutions using the equilibrium factor demand functions for oil and the capacity utilization rate, the production function can be reduced to
where is a positive constant, n a k
After rewriting the production function in this way, we can notice several things. First, the oil price serves as an adverse productivity shock in the model (
). In particular, the larger the cost share of oil, a o , the larger the impact an oil price shock has on total factor productivity (since ao n 1 ao n increases with a o ). In addition, the cost share of oil enhances the output elasticity of labor (since an n 1 ao n also increases with a o ). Second, capacity utilization ampli…es the impact of oil shocks. Capacity utilization introduces a new term, n = a k > 1 (since > 1), into the output elasticities with respect to p o and n.
Thus, capacity utilization magni…es the impact of an oil shock via two channels: a direct channel, via its positive e¤ect on the output elasticity of total factor productivity, and an indirect channel, via its positive e¤ect on the output elasticity of labor. Third, capacity utilization enhances returns to scale if a k + a n + a o > 1; because k + n a k + a n + a o ; with equality only if a k + a n + a o = 1. 4 The model can be solved by log-linearizing the …rst order conditions around the steady state.
It is shown by Wen (1998) 
where M is a full-rank matrix with both eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle on the complex plane, and t+1 is a one-step-ahead forecasting error of output, de…ned as t =ŷ t E t 1ŷt ; which satis…es E t t+1 = 0 for all t: The forecast error may serve as a source of sunspots or animal spirits in this model when indeterminacy arises. 5 In this paper, we assume there are no sunspots by setting 4 Finn's (2000) model of capacity utilization is slightly di¤erent from this one, but the mechanisms are similar. 5 See Cass and Shell (1983) for the early literature on sunspot-driven ‡uctuations.
= 0. This implies that the indeterminacy of the initial output level, given the state fk 0 ; p 0 g, can be resolved by settingŷ 0 = 0. 6
Calibration
We calibrate the model using the following parameter values, which are standard in the literature for quarterly models: = 0 (indivisible labor), = 0:99; and = 1:4 (implying a steady-state rate of = 0:025). Since the model can be mapped into a perfectly competitive model with aggregate production externalities, we calibrate the technology parameters, f ; a k ; a n ; a o g, according to an externality version of the model. Denote the externality parameter for production by ; in a symmetric equilibrium the aggregate version of the intermediate sector's production function can then be written as
where the aggregate returns to scale are given by 1+ . This model is equivalent to the monopolistic competition model if (1 + ) = 1; a k = k (1 + ); a n = n (1 + ), and a o = (1 k n )(1 + ). Thus, we can calibrate the output elasticity parameters in the production function according to each production factor's cost share in output. Following the existing literature (e.g., Benhabib and 
Predictions
Before presenting the predictions of our model, we …rst present the predictions of standard models so as to highlight the importance of the multiplier-accelerator mechanism missing in standard models.
The predictions of a model with constant returns to scale ( = 0), perfect competition ( = 1), and Second and most strikingly, the model is able to predict the U-shaped transitional dynamics seen in the data. For example, the model predicts that the trough of the recession is delayed by 4-6 quarters after the oil price increase in late 1973, and that there will be a recovery in 1976-78. The model tends to under-predict the recession in consumption and over-predict the recession in employment.
Overall, however, the improvements of the model over the standard models are signi…cant.
Dissecting the Multiplier-Accelerator E¤ect
The reason for the model's success lies in a multiplier-accelerator mechanism emerging under externalities (or monopolistic competition with increasing returns to scale). This mechanism gives rise to dampened cycles. To understand the multiplier-accelerator mechanism, recall that the reducedform production function is given by Equation (2) . If, on the other hand, we use the externality version of the model by setting a o = o (1+ ); a k = k (1+ ); a n = n (1+ ); and o + k + n = 1, the reduced-form aggregate production function can be written as
where n k (1+ ) ; k . Based on our calibration of oil's share in production, the oil elasticity is 0:015 and the labor elasticity is 0: 71, suggesting that a doubling of the oil price (a 100% increase) translates to less than a 1:5% change in output, holding labor constant. Since a higher oil price decreases labor's productivity, employment will also decrease, amplifying the impact of oil price on output. For simplicity, assume that labor decreases by 1%. Then there will be an additional 0:71% change in output. The total output change is thus about 2:2%. to about a 3% decrease in output under the maintained assumption that labor decreases by just 1%. Thus the multiplier e¤ect of capacity utilization is approximately 1:3. This multiplier e¤ect, however, is too small to account for the data. 8 8 The reason that Finn's (2000) model has a large enough multiplier to match the depth of the recession is that she assumes a much larger oil share in the US aggregate production. Her calibration is equivalent to setting o = 0:043; implying an output elasticity of the oil price in the order of Hence, judged by the instantaneous multiplier, the total change in output is still roughly 3% in the impact period. But, under the in ‡uence of the intertemporal multiplier (i.e., the accelerator), output continues to decrease for several quarters before a trough is reached. Based on our parameter calibration, at the trough, output is about 8% below its initial value.
If capacity utilization is variable, then the oil price elasticity is given by
The cyclical propagation mechanism (or intertemporal multiplier) arises under externalities because …rms' production decisions and investment activities reinforce each other, causing the aggregate economy to over-shoot the steady state as the economy converges. Such over-shooting behavior implies cycles. Consider a permanent increase in the oil price. The rise in the oil price increases the marginal cost of production at the …rm level, hence reducing oil demand as well as employment and capacity utilization. This causes a contraction in output. Anticipating a lower future productivity of capital, …rms also reduce investment spending, depressing aggregate demand and leading to a fall in the capital stock. Due to the force of externalities among …rms, this becomes a cumulative process of contractions. As the contraction continues, the rising marginal product of capital dictates that the decrease in output slow down (de-accelerate). The result is that sooner or later the capital stock and output must stop declining, and capacity utilization and investment must start to increase to exploit the excessively high marginal product of capital at a business-cycle trough. But then a rise in investment demand also triggers output expansion. Thus, the above propagation mechanism reverses itself, leading to a cumulative process of recovery and expansion.
Empirical Evidence
Although the model predicts that oil prices alone can explain the movements of the U.S. economy after the oil shocks in 1973-74, there is no prior reason to believe that this is indeed the case for the U.S. economy. It is, for example, entirely possible that non-oil shocks, such as monetary shocks, also contributed to the business cycle following the oil price increases in the early 70s. If this is the case, then being able to fully account for the deep recession by oil shocks alone may not be a good property for the model to have. Hence, empirically estimating the e¤ects of the oil shocks in the early 70s on the U.S. economy can provide evidence to support (or reject) the model. Unfortunately, it is in general very di¢ cult to identify the exact e¤ect of oil shocks and non-oil shocks quantitatively in empirical studies because any such attempt via structural VARs inevitably involves identifying assumptions that are theory-loaded and hence may not necessarily be true. Therefore, the evidence provided in this section can only be viewed as circumstantial, and it serves only as a reference point for our theoretical analysis. More empirical studies are needed to further validate and recon…rm our …ndings. We focus our attention …rst on the e¤ects of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973.
To study the e¤ects of exogenous oil shocks on the U.S. economy, we …rst decompose movements in the price of imported oil into those driven by non-domestic (or exogenous) factors and those driven by domestic (or endogenous) factors. Econometric tests show that post-war oil prices, especially prior to the mid-80s, can be best described as random walks. Hence, our methodology for identifying the exogenous factors is based on a long-run restriction on the e¤ect of an oil shock (e.g., the OPEC decision to raise the oil price) on the nominal oil price, following the econometric methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989) . We assume that an exogenous oil shock (such as the OPEC embargo)
is an innovation that can have a permanent e¤ect on the oil price, and that other factors, which may potentially have an impact on oil prices through demand-side e¤ects, can only have transitory e¤ects on the oil price. Based on this identifying assumption, our empirical result attributes more than 95% of the movements in the oil price to the exogenous oil shocks. This is consistent with a large body of empirical literature that has convincingly argued that post-war movements in oil prices (at least up to the mid-1980s) were largely exogenous to U.S. economic activity (see, e.g., Hamilton 1983 and the literature cited in the Introduction). Our identifying assumption is hence reasonable for the period we study.
Based on this identi…cation assumption, we can also decompose movements in the U.S. economy into those driven by oil shocks and those driven by non-oil shocks. In order to best capture the e¤ect of non-oil shocks on the U.S. economy, we have included several variables in our VAR: GDP, consumption, investment, and employment. Our results are robust when monetary policy variables, such as the interest rate and money supply, are included in the VAR. We do not impose prior restrictions on the impact of oil shocks on the other variables in the VAR, such as the output level. Instead, we allow the data to tell us how those U.S. variables respond to the oil shocks so identi…ed.
The data used in our analysis are seasonally adjusted quarterly data starting in 1950:1 and ending in 1978:4, right before the second major oil shock hit the economy in 1979 (which is also a time when the economy had completely recovered to its pre-1973 shock level relative to the trend).
The oil price data we use is the spot oil price of the West Texas Intermediate (available from the What matters are the identi…cations imposed on the non-oil shocks as a group. We therefore apply the Choleski triangularization to a long-run matrix to identify the sum of the non-oil shocks. To uncover the log levels of the time series, we integrate the growth rate series by adding a constant to each variable (based on the mean growth rates of the data) to induce a linear growth trend. 9 Figure 4 . E¤ects of Non-Oil Shocks on the U.S. Economy (solid lines).
The empirical results are reported in two …gures. First, the identi…ed e¤ects of the non-oil shocks on output, consumption, investment, and employment are reported in Figure 4 . We see that ‡uctuations driven by non-oil shocks track the actual movements in output, consumption, investment, and employment very well before the oil crisis (between 1950 and the early 1970s),
suggesting that the oil shocks are not the main source of the business cycle for the entire period prior to 1973. 10 In other words, non-oil shocks have been mainly responsible for all of the business cycles in the U.S. from 1950 until 1973. Starting from 1974, however, the picture changes dramatically. 9 Recall that the linear growth trends were removed during the VAR estimation since a constant is included in the VAR.
1 0 This does not imply that the oil shocks are not related to recessions prior to 1973. The …gure simply indicates that at a quantitative level, oil shocks on their own did not play a crucial role in U.S. economic activity prior to 1973.
Non-oil shocks are no longer able to explain the movements in output, consumption, investment and employment. This stunning fact can also be seen in Figure 5 , which shows the sole e¤ects of the oil shocks on the U.S. economy. There we see that, in complement to Figure Robustness: The model's predictions in the previous section and the VAR analysis in the current section are based on the nominal oil price. We have also simulated our model and estimated the VAR using the real oil price, de…ned as the ratio of the nominal oil price to the GDP de ‡ator.
The results are almost exactly the same as those obtained under the nominal oil price for both the theoretical model and the empirical VAR. 11 In addition, we have also tried to follow the idea of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) by identifying the component in the real oil price that is due to oil shocks in the nominal oil price. Then the movements in the real oil price due to the oil shocks are fed into our theoretical model. The predictions remain essentially the same.
We have also conducted robustness analysis on the identifying restrictions and the speci…cations used in the VARs. Bernanke et al. (1997) and especially Barsky and Kilian (2001) argue that 1 1 This is so because real oil prices move very closely with nominal oil prices in that period. 4 The Second Oil Price Shock: 1979 Shock: -1980 In this section we extend our analysis beyond 1978 to 1984, studying the e¤ects of the oil crisis in 1979-80. 12 The predictions of our model for the e¤ect of the second oil shock are presented in Thus, our model still accords reasonably well with the experience of the early 80s. 1 2 We do not go beyond 1984 in our analysis because there is evidence of a structural change in the relation between oil and the rest of the economy in the mid-80s. In particular, after the mid-80s negative oil price shocks become frequent and tend not to have much e¤ect on the economy due to the well-known asymmetry of oil shocks discussed by Hamilton (2003) and Mork (1989) . Our model, like the model of Finn and that of Rotemberg and Woodford, implies a symmetric e¤ect of oil shocks and is hence not suitable for analyzing the e¤ects of oil shocks after the mid-80s. 1 3 This is the VAR used earlier with the sample period extended to 1984. Interestingly, such results, based on both the theoretical model and the empirical VARs, are remarkably consistent with the empirical …ndings of Hooker (1996) . Based on an extensive empirical analysis that is independent and signi…cantly di¤erent from ours, Hooker concludes that "historical decompositions indicate that the oil price shock of 1973 had a large and well-measured impact on the macroeconomy, while that of 1979 was signi…cant but incomplete in capturing the dynamics of the 1980-82 recession" (Hooker, 1996 , p211).
Concluding Remarks
Standard models are not able to quantitatively account for the deep recession in the mid-70s when the actual oil price series is used for model simulations, despite the common belief that oil shocks in the 1970s are responsible for that recession. In this paper, we provide support for the importance of oil shocks in driving U.S. economic ‡uctuations in the 1970s. Our results strengthen the …ndings of a large body of empirical literature that suggests that the oil crisis in the early 1970s is responsible for the deep recession in 1975. We argue that the failure of standard models hinges on a missing multiplier-accelerator mechanism that serves to amplify and propagate the impact of oil shocks throughout the U.S. economy. We construct such a multiplier-accelerator mechanism in a general equilibrium model and show that the mechanism is capable of explaining the important features of the data.
